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Recording by Moira Fogarty, the Art of War by Sun Zhu, translated by Lionel Giles,

Part 1, Laying Plans.

Sun Zhu said, "The art of war is a vital importance to the state. It is a matter of life and

death, a road either to safety or to ruin. Hence it is a subject of inquiry which can on

no account be neglected. The art of war then is governed by five constant factors to be taken into

account in one's deliberations, when seeking to determine the conditions of taining in the

field. These are, 1. The moral law, 2. Heaven, 3. Earth, 4. The commander, 5. Method,

and discipline. The moral law causes. Method and Discipline

The moral law causes the people to be in complete accord with their ruler so that they

will follow him regardless of their lives undismade by any danger.

Heaven signifies night and day, cold and heat, times and seasons. Earth comprises distances, great and small, danger and security,

open ground and narrow passes, the chances of life and death. The commander

stands for the virtues of wisdom, sincerity, benevolence, courage and strictness.

By method and discipline are to be understood the marshaling of the army in

its proper subdivisions,

the graduations of rank among the officers, the maintenance of roads by which supplies may reach the army,

and the control of military expenditure.

These five heads should be familiar to every general.

He who knows them will be victorious. He who knows them not will fail.

Therefore, in your deliberations,

when seeking to determine the military conditions,

let them be made the basis of comparison in this wise.

One, which of the two sovereigns

is imbued with the moral law?

Two, which of the two generals has most ability?

Three, with whom lie the advantages derived from heaven and earth.

Four, on which side is discipline most rigorously enforced.

Five, which army is stronger?

Six, on which side are officers and men more highly trained?

Seven, in which army is there the greater constancy, both in reward and punishment?

By means of these seven considerations I can forecast victory or defeat.

The general that harkens to my council and acts upon it will conquer. Let such a one be

retained in command. The general that harkens not to my council nor acts upon it will suffer

defeat. Let such a one be dismissed.

While heating the profit of my council, avail yourself also of any helpful circumstances over and beyond the ordinary rules.

According as circumstances are favorable, one should modify one's plans.

All warfare is based on deception. Hence, when able to attack, we must seem unable.

When using our forces, we must seem inactive.

When we are near, we must make the enemy believe we are far away.

When far away, we must make him believe we are near.

Hold out baits to entice the enemy,

feign disorder and crush him.

If he is secure at all points, be prepared for

him. If he is in superior strength, evade him. If your opponent is of choleric temper,

seek to irritate him, pretend to be weak that he may grow arrogant. If he is taking

his ease, give him no rest. If his forces are united, separate them.

Attack him where he is unprepared.

Appear where you are not expected.

These military devices, leading to victory, must not be divulged beforehand.

Now the general who wins a battle makes many calculations in his temple air the battle

is fought.

The general who loses a battle makes but few calculations beforehand.

Thus do many calculations lead to victory and few calculations to defeat.

How much more no calculation at all.

It is by attention to this point that I can foresee who is likely to win or lose.

End of Part 1.

Part 2.

Waging War.

Sun Siu said, "In the operations of war, where there are in the field a thousand swift

chariots, as many heavy chariots, and a hundred thousand male-clad soldiers, with provisions

enough to carry them a thousand lee, the expenditure at home and at the front, including entertainment

of guests, small items such as glue and paint, and some spent on chariots and armor, will

reach the total of a thousand ounces of silver per day, such as the cost of raising an army

of a hundred thousand men. When you engage in actual fighting, if victory is long incoming,

then men's weapons will grow dull and their art will be damped.

If you lay siege to a town, you will exhaust your strength.

Again, if the campaign is protracted, the resources of the state will not be equal to the

strain.

Now when your weapons are dulled, your art are damped, your strength exhausted, and your

treasure spent.

Other chieftains will spring up to take advantage

of your extremity. Then no man, however wise, will be able to overt the consequences that

must ensue. Thus, though we have heard of stupid hasten war, cleverness has never been seen

associated with long delays. There is no instance of a country having benefited from prolonged

warfare.

It is only one who is thoroughly acquainted with the evils of war that can thoroughly

understand the profitable way of carrying it on.

The skillful soldier does not raise a second levy.

Neither are his supply wagons loaded more than twice.

Bring war material with you from home, but forage on the enemy.

Thus the army will have food enough for its needs.

Poverty of the state ex-checker causes an army to be maintained by contributions from a distance.

Contributing to maintain an army at a distance causes the people to be impoverished.

On the other hand, the proximity of an army causes prices to go up,

and high prices cause the people's substance to be drained away.

When their substances drained away, the peasantry will be afflicted by heavy executions. With

this loss of substance and exhaustion of strength, the homes of the people will be stripped bare,

and three tenths of their income will be dissipated. While government expenses for broken

chariots, worn-out horses, breastplates and helmets,

bows and arrows, spears and shields, protective mantles, draft oxen and heavy wagons, will

amount to four tenths of its total revenue.

Hence, a wise general makes a point of foraging on the enemy.

One cartload of the enemy's provisions is equivalent to twenty of one's own, and likewise a single peacle of his preventer is equivalent to twenty from one's own store.

Now, in order to kill the enemy, our men must be roused to anger, but there may be

advantage from defeating the enemy, they must have their rewards.

Therefore, in chariot fighting, when ten or more chariots have been taken,

those should be rewarded who took the first. Our own flags should be substituted for those of the enemy, and their chariots mingled and

used in conjunction with ours.

The captured soldiers should be kindly treated and kept.

This is called "Using the Concord Foe to augment one's own strength."

In more than, let your great object be victory, not lengthy campaigns. Thus it may be known that the leader of armies is the arbiter of the people's fate,

the man on whom it depends whether the nation shall be in peace or in peril."

End of Part 2

Recorded in Toronto, Ontario by Moira Fogady, October 2006.

This is a Libravox Recording.

All Libravox recordings are in the public domain.

For more information and to find out how you can volunteer, please visit Libravox.org.

Recording by Moira Fogadi.

The Art of War by Sun Zhu translated by Lionel Giles.

Part 3. Attack by Stratagem Sun Zhu said, "In the practical art of war, the best thing of all

is to take the enemy's country whole and intact, to shatter and destroy it is not so good.

So too it is better to recapture an army entire than to destroy it, to capture a regiment,

a detachment, or a company entire than to destroy them.

Hence to fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence.

Supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting.

Thus the highest form of general ship is to bulk the enemy's plans. The next best is to

prevent the junction of the enemy's forces. The next in order is to

attack the enemy's army in the field, and the worst policy of all is to

besiege walled cities. The rule is not to besiege walled cities if it

can possibly be avoided. The preparation of mantlets, movable shelters,

and various implements of war, will take up three whole months, and the piling up of

mounds against the walls will take three months more. The general, unable to control his

irritation, will launch his men to the assault like swarming ants, with the result that one

third of his men are slain, while the town still remains untaken, such are the disastrous effects of a siege. Therefore the skillful

leaders subdues the enemy's troops without any fighting. He captures their

cities without laying siege to them. He overthrows their kingdom without lengthy

operations in the field. With his forces intact he will dispute the mastery of

the empire, and thus,

without losing a man, his triumph will be complete. This is the method of attacking by

stratagem. It is the rule in war if our forces are

ten to the enemy's one to surround him, if five to one to attack him, if twice as numerous

to divide our army into two. If equally matched, we can offer battle.

If slightly inferior in numbers, we can avoid the enemy.

If quite unequal in every way, we can flee from him.

Hence, though an obstinate fight may be made by a small force,

in the end it must be captured by the larger force.

Now the general is the bulwark of the state.

If the bulwark is complete at all points, the state will be strong.

If the bulwark is defective, the state will be weak.

There are three ways in which a ruler can bring misfortune upon his army.

One, by commanding the army to advance or to retreat,

being ignorant of the fact that it cannot obey.

This is called hobbling the army.

Two, by attempting to govern an army in the same way as he administers a kingdom, being ignorant

of the conditions which obtain in an army. This causes restlessness in the soldier's

minds.

3. By employing the officers of his army without discrimination through ignorance of the

military principle of adaptation to circumstances, This shakes the confidence of the soldiers.

But when the army is restless and distrustful, trouble is sure to come from the other feudal princes.

This is simply bringing anarchy into the army and flinging victory away.

Thus we may know that there are five essentials for victory.

One, he will win who knows when to fight

and when not to fight. Two, he will win who knows how to handle both superior and inferior

forces. Three, he will win whose army is animated by the same spirit throughout all its ranks.

Four, he will win who prepared himself waits to take the enemy unprepared.

5. He will win who has military capacity and is not interfered with by the sovereign.

Hence the saying, "If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result

of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained

you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat.

If you know neither the enemy know yourself, you will succumb in every battle.

End of Part 3 Part 4 Tactical Dispositions

Sun Tsu said, "The good fighters of old first put themselves beyond the possibility of defeat,

and then waited for an opportunity of defeating the enemy.

To secure ourselves against defeat lies in our own hands, but the opportunity of defeating

the enemy is provided by the enemy himself.

Thus the good fighter is able to secure himself against defeat, but cannot make certain of

defeating the enemy."

Hence the saying, "One may know how to conquer without being able to do it."

Security against defeat implies defensive tactics.

Ability to defeat the enemy means taking the offensive.

Standing on the defensive indicates insufficient strength, attacking a superabundance of strength.

The general who is skilled in defense hides in the most secret recesses of the earth.

He who is skilled in attacked flashes forth from the topmost heights of heaven.

Thus on the one hand we have ability to protect ourselves, on the other a victory that is

complete.

To see victory only when it is within the Ken of the common herd is not the Acme of

excellence. To see victory only when it is within the Ken of the common herd is not the Acme of Excellence.

Neither is it the Acme of Excellence if you fight and conquer, and the whole Empire says, "Well done!"

To lift an autumn hair is no sign of great strength.

To see the sun in moon is no sign of sharp sight.

To hear the noise of thunder is no sign of a quick ear. What the ancients called a clever

fighter is one who not only wins, but excels in winning with ease. Hence his victories bring

him neither reputation for wisdom nor credit for courage. He wins his battles by making

no mistakes. Making no mistakes is what establishes the certainty of victory, for it means conquering

an enemy that is already defeated. Hence the skillful fighter puts himself into a position

which makes defeat impossible and does not miss the moment for defeating the enemy. Thus

it is that in war the victorious strategist only seeks battle after the victory has been

one, whereas he who is destined to defeat first fights and afterwards looks for victory.

The consummate leader cultivates the moral law and strictly adheres to method and discipline,

thus it is in his power to control success.

In respect of military method we have, firstly, measurement, secondly, estimation of quantity, thirdly, calculation,

fourthly, balancing of chances, fifthly, victory.

Measurement owes its existence to earth, estimation of quantity to measurement, calculation to

estimation of quantity, balancing of chances to calculation, and victory to balancing of

chances. A victorious army army opposed to a routed

one is as a pound's weight placed in the scale against a single grain. The onrush of a conquering

force is like the bursting of pent-up waters into a chasm a thousand fathoms deep. End of part 4.

Part 4. Recorded in Toronto, Ontario by Moira Fogarty, October 2006. This is a Libravox Recording. All Libravox recordings are in the public domain. For more information

and to find out how you can volunteer, please visit LibraVox.org, recording by Moira Fogridi.

The Art of War by Sunzu, translated by Lionel Giles, Part 5, Energy.

Sunzu said, "The control of a large force is the same principle as the control of a few

men.

It is merely a question of dividing up their numbers.

Fighting with a large army under your command is no-wise different from fighting with a small

one. It is merely a question of instituting signs and signals.

To ensure that your whole host may withstand the brunt of the enemy's attack and remain

unshaken, this is affected by maneuvers direct and indirect. That the impact of your army may be like a grindstone dashed against an egg, this is

affected by the science of weak points and strong.

In all fighting, the direct method may be used for joining battle, but indirect methods

will be needed in order to secure victory.

Indirect tactics, efficiently applied, are inexhaustible as heaven and earth, on ending as the

flow of rivers and streams, like the sun and moon they end but to begin anew, like the

four seasons, they pass away to return once more.

There are not more than five musical notes, yet the combinations of these five give rise

to more melodies than can ever be heard. There are not more than five primary colors, blue, yellow, red, white, and black; yet in

combination they produce more hues than can ever be seen.

There are not more than five cardinal tastes, sour, acrid, salt, sweet, bitter; yet combinations

of them yield more flavors than can ever be tasted.

In battle there are not more than two methods of attack, the direct and the indirect, yet

these two in combination give rise to an endless series of maneuvers.

The direct and the indirect lead on to each other in turn.

It is like moving in a circle, you never come to an end.

Who can exhaust the possibilities of their combination?

The onset of troops is like the rush of a torrent which will even roll stones

along in its course. The quality of decision is like the well-timed swoop of a

falcon which enables it to strike and destroy its victim. Therefore the good

fighter will be terrible in his onset and prompt in his decision.

Energy may be likened to the bending of a crossbow, decision to the releasing of a trigger.

Amid the turmoil and tumult of battle, there may be seeming disorder and yet no real disorder

at all.

Amid confusion and chaos, your array may be without head or tail, yet it will be proof

against a feet.

Simulated disorder postulates perfect discipline.

Simulated fear postulates courage.

Simulated weakness postulates strength.

Hiding order beneath the cloak of disorder is simply a question of subdivision.

Concealing courage under their show of timidity presupposes a fund of latent energy.

Masking strength with weakness is to be affected by tactical dispositions.

Thus one who is skillful at keeping the enemy on the move maintains deceitful appearances,

according to which the enemy will act.

He sacrifices something that the enemy may snatch at it.

By holding out baits, he keeps him

on the march, then, with the body of picked men, he lies in weight for him. The clever

combatant looks to the effect of combined energy, and does not require too much from individuals,

hence his ability to pick out the right men and utilize combined energy. When he utilizes

combined energy, his fighting men become as it were

like unto rolling logs or stones, for it is the nature of a log or stone to remain motionless

on level ground, and to move when on a slope. If for cornered to come to a standstill, but

if round shaped to go rolling down. Thus the energy developed by good fighting men is

as the momentum of a round stone rolled

down a mountain thousands of feet in height, so much on the subject of energy.

End of Part 5 Part 6. Week points and strong.

Sun Tsu said, "Whoever is first in the field and awaits the coming of the enemy will be fresh for the fight.

Whoever is second in the field and has to hasten to battle will arrive exhausted."

Therefore, the clever combatant imposes his will on the enemy, but does not cause the enemy to approach of his own accord,

or by inflicting damage, he can make it impossible for the enemy to draw near.

If the enemy is taking his ease, he can harass him.

If well supplied with food, he can starve him out.

If quietly encamped, he can force him to move.

Appear at points which the enemy must hasten to defend.

March swiftly to places where you

are not expected.

An army may march great distances without distress if it marches through country where

the enemy is not.

You can be sure of succeeding in your attacks if you only attack places which are undefended.

You can ensure the safety of your defense if you only hold positions that cannot be attacked.

Hence that general is skillful in attack whose opponent does not know what to defend, and

he is skillful in defense whose opponent does not know what to attack.

O divine art of subtlety and secrecy!

Through you we learn to be invisible, through you inaudible, and hence we can hold the

enemies' fate in our hands.

You may advance and be absolutely irresistible if you make for the enemy's weak points.

You may retire and be safe from pursuit if your movements are more rapid than those of

the enemy.

If we wish to fight, the enemy can be forced to an engagement, even though he be sheltered

behind a high rampart and a deep ditch.

All we need do is attack some other place that he will be obliged to relieve.

If we do not wish to fight, we can prevent the enemy from engaging us even though the

lines of our encampment be merely traced out on the ground.

All we need do is throw something odd and unaccountable in his way.

By discovering the enemy's dispositions and remaining invisible ourselves, we can keep

our forces concentrated while the enemies must be divided.

We can form a single united body while the enemy must split up into fractions.

Hence there will be a whole pitted against separate parts of a whole, which means that

we shall be many to the enemy's few. And if we are able thus to attack an inferior force with a superior one, our

opponents will be in dire straits. The spot where we intend to fight must not be made

known, for then the enemy will have to prepare against a possible attack at several different

points. And his force is being thus distributed in many directions, the numbers we shall have

to face at any given point will be proportionately few.

For should the enemy strengthen his van, he will weaken his rear?

Should he strengthen his rear, he will weaken his van?

Should he strengthen his left?

He will weaken his right?

Should he strengthen his right?

He will weaken his left?

If he sends reinforcements everywhere, he will weaken his left. If he sends reinforcements everywhere,

he will everywhere be weak. Numerical weakness comes from having to prepare against possible attacks.

Numerical strength, from compelling our adversary to make these preparations against us.

Knowing the place and the time of the coming battle, we may concentrate from the greatest

distances in order to fight. But if neither time nor place be known, then the left wing will be impotent to

secure the right, the right equally impotent to secure the left, the van unable to relieve

the rear or the rear to support the van. How much more so if the furtherest proportions

of the army are anything under a hundredly apart, and even the nearest are separated by several li.

Though according to my estimate the soldiers of UA exceed our own in number, that shall

advantage them nothing in the matter of victory.

I say then that victory can be achieved.

Though the enemy be stronger in numbers, we may prevent him from fighting.

Scheme so as to discover his plans and the likelihood

of their success. Rouse him and learn the principle of his activity or inactivity. Force

him to reveal himself so as to find out his vulnerable spots. Carefully compare the opposing

army with your own so that you may know where strength is super abundant and where it is

deficient. In making tactical dispositions, the highest pitch you can attain is to conceal them.

Conceal your dispositions and you will be safe from the prying of the subtlest spies

from the machinations of the wisest brains.

How victory may be produced for them out of the enemy's own tactics?

That is what the multitude cannot comprehend.

All men can see the tactics whereby

I conquer, but what none can see is the strategy out of which victory is evolved. Do not repeat

the tactics which have gained you one victory, but let your methods be regulated by the infinite

variety of circumstances. Military tactics are like unto water; for water in its natural course runs away from

high places and hastens downwards.

So in war, the way is to avoid what is strong and to strike at what is weak.

Water shapes its course according to the nature of the ground over which it flows.

The soldier works out his victory in relation to the foe whom he is facing. Therefore, just as water retains no constant

shape, in warfare, there are no constant conditions. He who can modify his tactics in relation

to his opponent and thereby succeed in winning may be called a heaven-born captain.

The five elements, water, fire, wood, metal, earth are not always equally predominant. The four seasons make

way for each other in turn. There are short days and long. The moon has its periods of

waning and waxing.

End of Part 6 by Moyrophogody October 2006.

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Recording by Moyrophogody The Art of War by Sun Tzu translated by Lionel Giles.

Part VII.

Manuvering Sun Tzu said, "In war, the general receives his commands from the sovereign.

Having collected an army and concentrated his forces, he must blend and harmonize the

different elements thereof before pitching his camp.

After that comes tactical maneuvering, then which there is nothing more difficult.

The difficulty of tactical maneuvering consists in turning the devious into the direct and

misfortune into gain.

Thus, to take a long and secuitous route, after enticing the enemy out of the way, and

those starting after him, to contrive to reach the goal before him, shows knowledge of

the Artifice of Deviation.

Manoeuvring with an army is advantageous, with an undisciplined multitude most dangerous.

If you set a fully equipped army in March in order to snatch an advantage, the chances

are that you will be too late. On the other hand, to detach a flying column for the

purpose involves the sacrifice of its baggage and stores. Thus, if you order your men to

roll up their buffcoats and make forced marches without halting day or night, covering double

the usual distance at a stretch, doing a hundredly

in order to rest an advantage, the leaders of all your three divisions will fall into the

hands of the enemy. The stronger men will be in front, the jaded ones will fall behind,

and on this plan only one-tenth of your army will reach its destination.

If you march fiftily in order to outmaneuver the enemy, you will lose the leader

of your first division and only half your force will reach the goal. If you march 30 Lee

with the same object, two-thirds of your army will arrive.

We may take it then that an army without its baggage train is lost, without provisions

it is lost, without basis of supply it is lost.

We cannot enter into alliances until we are acquainted with the designs of our neighbors.

We are not fit to lead an army on the march unless we are familiar with the face of the

country.

It's mountains and forests, it's pitfalls and precipices, it's marshes and swamps.

We shall be unable to turn natural advantage to account

unless we make use of local guides. In war, practice dissimulation and you will succeed.

Whether to concentrate or to divide your troops must be decided by circumstances.

Let your rapidity be that of the wind, your compactness that of the forest,

in raiding and plundering be like fire,

in a moveability like a mountain.

Let your plans be dark and impenetrable as night,

and when you move, fall like a thunderbolt.

When you plunder a countryside, let the spoil be divided amongst

your men.

When you capture new territory, cut it up into allotments

for the benefit of the soldiery.

Ponder and deliberate before you make a move.

He will conquer who has learnt the artifice of deviation, such as the art of maneuvering.

The Book of Army Management says, "On the field of battle, the spoken word does not carry far enough,

hence the institution of gongs and drums.

Nor can ordinary objects be seen clearly enough, hence the institution of banners and flags.

Gongs and drums, banners and flags, are means whereby the ears and eyes of the host may

be focused on one particular point.

The host thus forming a single united body, it is impossible either for the brave

to advance alone, or for the cowardly to retreat alone. This is the art of handling large

masses of men. In night fighting, then, make much use of signal-fliers and drums, and

inviting by day a flag and banners as a means of influencing the ears and eyes of your army. A whole army

may be robbed of its spirit; a commander in chief may be robbed of his presence of mind.

Now a soldier's spirit is keenest in the morning. By noon day it has begun to flag, and in

the evening his mind is bent only on returning to camp. A clever general therefore avoids

an army when it's spirit is keen, but attacks it when it is sluggish and inclined to camp. A clever general therefore avoids an army when it spirit is keen, but

attacks it when it is sluggish and inclined to return. This is the art of studying moods.

Disciplined and calm to await the appearance of disorder and hubbub amongst the enemy,

this is the art of retaining self-possession. To be near the goal, while the enemy is still

far from it, to wait at ease while the enemy is still far from it, to wait at ease while the

enemy is toiling and struggling, to be well fed while the enemy is famished, this is the

art of husbanding one's strength.

To refrain from intercepting an enemy whose banners are in perfect order, to refrain from

attacking an army drawn up in calm and confident array, this is the art of studying

circumstances.

It is a military axiom not to advance uphill against the enemy, nor to oppose him when

he comes downhill.

Do not pursue an enemy who simulates flight.

Do not attack soldiers whose temper is keen.

Do not swallow bait offered by the enemy.

Do not interfere with an army that is returning home.

When you surround an army, leave an outlet free. Do not press a desperate foe too hard.

Such is the art of warfare. End of Part 7. Part 8. Variation in Tactics Sun Zhu said, "In war, the general receives his commands from the sovereign, collects

his army, and concentrates his forces.

One in difficult country do not encamp.

In country where high roads intersect, join hands with your allies.

Do not linger in dangerously isolated positions.

Inhemmed in situations you must resort to stratagem,

in desperate position you must fight.

There are roads which must not be followed,

armies which must not be attacked,

towns which must not be besieged,

positions which must not be contested,

commands of the sovereign which must not be obeyed.

The general who thoroughly understands the advantages vested, commands of the sovereign which must not be obeyed.

The general who thoroughly understands the advantages that a company variation of tactics

knows how to handle his troops.

The general who does not understand these may be well acquainted with the configuration

of the country, yet he will not be able to turn his knowledge to practical account.

So the student of war who is unversed in the art of war of varying

his plans, even though he be acquainted with the five advantages, will fail to make the

best use of his men. Hence, in the wise leader's plans, considerations of advantage and

of disadvantage will be blended together. If our expectation of advantage be tempered

in this way, we may succeed in accomplishing

the essential part of our schemes.

If on the other hand, in the midst of difficulties we are always ready to seize an advantage, we

may extricate ourselves from misfortune.

Reduce the hostile chiefs by inflicting damage on them and make trouble for them and keep

them constantly engaged.

Hold out spacious allurements, and make them rushed to any given point.

The art of war teaches us to rely not on the likelihood of the enemy's not coming, but

on our own readiness to receive him.

Not on the chance of his not attacking, but rather on the fact that we have made our position

unassailable.

There are five dangerous faults which may affect a general; one, recklessness which leads

to destruction; two, cowardice which leads to capture; three, a hasty temper which can

be provoked by insults; four, a delicacy of honor which is sensitive to shame; 5. Oversolicitude for his men which

exposes him to worry and trouble. These are the five besetting sins of a general ruin

us to the conduct of war. When an army is overthrown and its leaders slain, the cause will

surely be found among these five dangerous faults. Let them be a subject of meditation.

End of Part 9. Recorded into Ronto, Ontario by Moira Fogarty, October 2006.

This is a LibriVox recording. All Libravox recordings are in the public domain.

For more information and to find out how you can volunteer, please visit Libravox.org,

recording by Moira Foguri.

The Art of War by Sun Tzu, translated by Lionel Giles.

Part 9.

The Army on the March.

Sun Tsui said, "We come now to the question of encamping the army and observing the signs

of the enemy.

Pass quickly over mountains and keep in the neighborhood of valleys.

Camp in high places facing the sun.

Do not climb heights in order to fight. So much for mountain warfare.

After crossing a river you should get far away from it. When an invading force crosses a river

in its armored march, do not advance to meet it in midstream. It will be best to let half the army

get across and then deliver your attack. If you are anxious

to fight, you should not go to meet the invader nearer river which he has to cross.

More your craft higher up than the enemy and facing the sun. Do not move upstream to

meet the enemy. So much for River Warfare. In crossing salt marshes, your soul concern should be to get over them

quickly without any delay. If forced to fight an assault marsh, you should have

water ingrass near you and get your back to a clump of trees. So much for

operations in salt marshes. In dry, level country, take up an easily accessible

position with rising ground to your right

and on your rear so that the danger may be in front and safety lie behind.

So much for campaigning in flat country.

These are the four useful branches of military knowledge which enabled the Yellow Emperor

to vanquish four several sovereigns.

All armies prefer high ground to low and sunny places to dark. If you are

careful of your men and camp on hard ground, the army will be free from disease of every kind,

and this will spell victory. When you come to a hill or a bank, occupy the sunny side with the

slope on your right rear. Thus you will at once act for the benefit of your soldiers,

and utilize the natural advantages of the ground.

When in consequence of heavy rains up country, a river which you wish to for it is swollen

and flecked with foam, you must wait until it subsides.

Country in which there are precipitous cliffs with torrents running between, deep natural

hollows, confined places, tangled thickets, quagmires and crevasses, should be left with

all possible speed and not approached.

While we keep away from such places, we should get the enemy to approach them.

While we face them, we should let the enemy have them on his rear.

If in the neighborhood of your camp there should be any hilly country, pawns surrounded

by aquatic grass, hollow basins filled with reeds, or woods with thick undergrowth. They

must be carefully routed out and searched, for these are places where men in ambush or

in city's spies are likely to be lurking.

When the enemy is close at hand and remains quiet, he is relying on the natural strength

of his position.

When he keeps aloof and tries to provoke a battle, he is anxious for the other side to

advance.

If his place of encampment is easy of access, he is tendering a bait.

Movement amongst the trees of a forest shows that the enemy is advancing.

The appearance of a number of screens in the midst of thick grass means that the enemy

wants to make us suspicious.

The rising of birds in their flight is the sign of an ambush god.

Startled beasts indicate that a sudden attack is coming. When there is dust rising in a high column, it is the sign of chariots advancing.

When the dust is low, but spread over a wide area, it betokens the approach of infantry.

When it branches out in different directions, it shows that parties have been sent to collect

firewood.

A few clouds of dust moving to and fro signify that

the army is encamping. Humble words and increased preparations are signs that the enemy is

about to advance. Violent language and driving forward as if to the attack are signs that

he will retreat. When the light chariots come out first and take up a position on the wings, it is a sign that the

enemy is forming for battle. Peace proposals on a company by a sworn covenant indicate a plot.

When there is much running about and the soldiers fall into rank, it means that the critical moment

has come. When some are seen advancing and some retreating, it is allure.

When the soldiers stand leaning on their spears, they are faint from want of food.

If those who are sent to draw water begin by drinking themselves, the army is suffering

from thirst.

If the enemy sees an advantage to be gained, it makes no effort to secure it, the soldiers

are exhausted.

If birds gather on any spot, it is unoccupied.

Clammer by night, but tokens nervousness.

If there is a disturbance in the camp, the general's authority is weak. If the banners

and flags are shifted about, sedition is a foot. If the officers are angry, it means that

the men are weary.

When an army feeds its horses with grain and kills its cattle for food, and when the men

do not hang their cooking pots over the campfires, showing that they will not return to their

tents, you may know that they are determined to fight to the death.

The sight of men whispering together in small knots, or speaking in subdued tones, points

to disaffection amongst the rank and file.

Two frequent rewards signify that the enemy is at the end of his resources.

Too many punishments, but tray a condition of dire distress.

To begin by bluster, but afterwards to take fright at the enemy's numbers, shows a supreme

lack of intelligence.

When envoys are sent with compliments in their mouths, it is a sign that the enemy wishes

for a truce.

If the enemy's troops march up angrily and remain facing hours for a long time without

either joining battle or taking themselves off again, the situation is one that demands

great vigilance and circumspection.

If our troops are no more in number than the enemy, that is amply sufficient.

It only means that no direct attack can be made.

What we can do is simply to concentrate all our available strength,

keep a close watch on the enemy, and obtain reinforcements. He who exercises no forethought but makes light of

his opponents is sure to be captured by them. If soldiers are punished before they have

grown attached to you, they will not prove submissive. And unless submissive, they will

be practically useless. If, when the soldiers have become attached to you, punishments are not enforced, they

will still be useless.

Therefore, soldiers must be treated in the first instance with humanity, but kept under

control by means of iron discipline.

This is a certain road to victory.

If in training soldiers commands are habitually enforced, the army will be well-disciplined.

If not, its discipline will be bad.

If a general shows confidence in his men, but always insists on his orders being obeyed,

the gain will be mutual.

End of Part 9.

Part 10.

Terrain Sun Tsu said we made distinguished six kinds of terrain.

To wit, one, accessible ground, two, entangling ground, three, temporizing ground, four narrow passes,

five precipitous heights, six, positions at a great distance from the enemy.

Ground which can be freely traversed by both sides is called accessible.

With regard to ground of this nature, be before the enemy in occupying the raised and sunny

spots and carefully guard your line of supplies. Then you will be able to fight with advantage.

Ground which can be abandoned but is hard to reoccupy is called entangling.

From a position of this sort, if the enemy is unprepared, you may

sally forth and defeat him.

But if the enemy is prepared for your coming and you fail to defeat him, then return

being impossible, disaster will ensue.

When the position is such that neither side will gain by making the first move, it is called

temporizing ground.

In a position of this sort, even though the enemy should offer us an attractive bait,

it will be advisable not to stir forth, but rather to retreat, thus enticing the enemy

in his turn.

Then, when part of his army has come out, we may deliver our attack with advantage.

With regard to narrow passes, if you can occupy them first, let them be strongly garrisoned

and await the advent of the enemy.

Should the army forstall you in occupying a pass, do not go after him if the pass is fully

garrisoned, but only if it is weakly

garrisoned. With regard to precipitous heights, if you are beforehand with your adversary,

you should occupy the raised and sunny spots, and there wait for him to come up. If the

enemy has occupied them before you, do not follow him but retreat and try to entice him

away.

If you are situated at a great distance from the enemy and the strength of the two armies

is equal, it is not easy to provoke a battle and fighting will be to your disadvantage.

These six are the principles connected with Earth.

The general who's attained a responsible post must be careful to study them.

Now an army is exposed to six several calamities, not arising from natural causes, but from

faults for which the general is responsible.

These are one, flight, two, insubordination, three, collapse, four, ruin, five, disorganization, six, route.

Other conditions being equal.

If one force is hurled against another ten times its size, the result will be the flight

of the former.

When the common soldiers are too strong and their officers too weak, the result is in

subordination. When the officers are too

strong and the common soldiers too weak, the result is collapse.

When the higher officers are angry and insubordinate and are meeting the enemy, give battle on their

own account from a feeling of resentment. Before the commander in chief can tell whether

or not he is in a position to fight, the result is ruin.

When the general is weak and without authority, when his orders are not clear and distinct,

when there are no fixed duties assigned to officers and men, and the ranks are formed

in a slavently haphazard manner, the result is utter disorganization.

When in general, unable to estimate the enemy's strength, allows an inferior force to engage

a larger one, or hurls a weak detachment against a powerful one, and neglects to place picked

soldiers in the front rank, the result must be route.

These are six ways of courting defeat, which must be carefully noted by the general who

is attained a responsible

post. The natural formation of the country is the soldier's best ally, but a power of

estimating the adversary of controlling the forces of victory end of shrewdly calculating

difficulties, dangers, and distances constitutes the test of a great general. He who knows

these things, and in fighting puts his knowledge into practice, will win great general. He who knows these things and in fighting puts his knowledge

into practice will win his battles. He who knows them not, nor practices them, will

surely be defeated. If fighting is short of result in victory, then you must fight, even

though the ruler forbid it. If fighting will not result in victory, then you must not fight

even at the ruler's bidding.

The general who advances without coveting fame and retreats without fearing disgrace, whose

only thought is to protect his country and do good service for his sovereign is the

jewel of the kingdom.

Regardless of your soldiers as your children and they will follow you into the deepest valleys.

Look upon them as your own beloved sons, and they will stand by you even unto death."

If, however, you are indulgent, but unable to make your authority felt,

kindhearted, but unable to enforce your commands, and incapable more over of quelling disorder.

Then your soldiers must be likened to spoiled children. They are useless for any practical purpose.

If we know that our own men are in a condition to attack,

but are unaware that the enemy is not open to attack,

we have gone only halfway towards victory.

If we know that the enemy is open to attack,

but are unaware that our own men are not in

a condition to attack, we have gone only halfway towards victory.

If we know that the enemy is open to attack and also know that our men are in a condition

to attack but are unaware that the nature of the ground makes fighting impracticable,

we have still only gone halfway towards victory.

Hence the experience soldier, once in motion, is never bewildered.

Once he is broken camp, he is never at a loss.

Hence the saying, "If you know the enemy and know yourself, your victory will not stand

in doubt.

If you know heaven and no earth, you may make your victory complete."

End of Part 10

Recorded in Toronto, Ontario, by Moira Fogadi, October 2006.

This is a Libravox recording. All Libravox recordings are in the public domain.

For more information and to find out how you can volunteer, please visit Libravox.org

Recording by Moira Fogadi

The Art of War by Sun Zhu, translated by Lionel Giles, Part 11, the nine situations. Sun-Zoo said

the art of war recognizes nine varieties of ground, one disperse of ground, two facile 3. Contentious Ground 4. Open Ground 5. Ground of Intersecting Highways

6. Serious Ground

7. Difficult Ground

8. Hemmed In Ground

9. Desperate Ground

When a chiefed in his fighting in his own territory, it is dispersive ground. When a chieftain is fighting in his own territory, it is dispersive ground. When

he is penetrated into hostile territory, but to no great distance, it is facile ground.

Ground of the possession of which imports great advantage to either side is contentious

ground. Ground on which each side has liberty of movement is open ground.

Ground which forms the key to three contiguous states so that he who occupies it first

has most of the empire at his command is a ground of intersecting highways.

When an army has penetrated into the heart of a hostile country, leaving a number of

fortified cities in its rear, it is serious ground.

Mountain forests, rugged steeps, marshes and fens, all country that is hard to traverse,

this is difficult ground.

Ground which is reached through narrow gorges, and from which we can only retire by tortuous

paths so that a small number of the enemy would suffice to crush

a large body of our men. This is hemmed in ground. Ground on which we can only be saved

from destruction by fighting without delay is desperate ground. On disperse of ground,

therefore, fight not. On facile ground, halt not. On contentious ground, attack not.

On open ground, do not try to block the enemy's way. On the ground of intersecting highways,

join hands with your allies. On serious ground, gather in plunder.

In difficult ground, keep steadily on the march. On hemmed in ground resort to stratagem. On desperate ground.

Fight. Those who were called skillful leaders of old knew how to drive a wedge between the

enemy's front and rear, to prevent cooperation between his large and small divisions, to

hinder the good troops from rescuing the bad, the officers

from rallying their men. When the enemy's men were united, they managed to keep them

in disorder. When it was to their advantage, they made a forward move; when otherwise they

stopped still. If asked how to cope with the great host of the enemy in orderly array,

and on the point of marching to the attack, I should say, begin by seizing something which your opponent holds

dear, then he will be amenable to your will.

Repinity is the essence of war.

Take advantage of the enemy's unreadiness.

Make your way by unexpected roots and attack unguarded spots.

The following are the principles to be observed by an invading force.

The further you penetrate into a country, the greater will be the solidarity of your

troops, and thus the defenders will not prevail against you.

Make forays in fertile country in order to supply your army with food.

Carefully study the well-being of your

men, and do not overtax them. Concentrate your energy and hoard your strength. Keep your

army continually on the move, and devise unfathomable plans. Throw your soldiers into positions

once there is no escape, and they will prefer death to flight. If they will face death, there

is nothing they may not achieve. Officers and men alike will put forth their uttermost

strength. Soldiers, when in desperate straits, lose the sense of fear. If there is no place

of refuge, they will stand firm. If they are in hostile country, they will show a stubborn front. If there is

no help for it, they will fight hard. Thus, without waiting to be martyled, the soldiers

will be constantly on the key-vive. Without waiting to be asked, they will do your will.

Without restrictions, they will be faithful. Without giving orders they can be trusted.

Prohibit the taking of almonds and do away with superstitious doubts, then, until death

itself comes, no calamity need be feared.

If our soldiers are not overburdened with money, it is not because they have a distaste

for riches.

If their lives are not unduly long, it is not because they

are disinclined to longevity. On the day they are ordered out to battle, your soldiers may

weep, those sitting up by doing their garments, and those lying down, letting the tears run

down their cheeks. But let them once be brought to bay, and they will display the courage of a choo or a quay.

The skillful tactician may be likened to the Shuai-jan.

Now, the Shuai-jan is a snake that is found in the Chiyong Mountains.

Strike at its head, and you will be attacked by its tail.

Strike at its tail, and you will be attacked by its head.

Strike at the middle, and you will be attacked by head and tail both.

Asked if an army can be made to imitate the Shuai-jian, I should answer yes.

For the men of Wu and the men of Yue are enemies.

Yet if they are crossing a river in the same boat and are caught by a storm, they will

come to each other's assistance just as the left hand helps the right. Hence, it is not enough to put one's trust in the tethering of horses and the burying of

chariot wheels in the ground.

The principle on which to manage an army is to set up one standard of courage, which all

must reach.

How to make the best of both strong and weak.

That is a question involving the proper use of ground.